One of the landmark reforms in the Philippine criminal justice system is Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act. The law was enacted to encourage witnesses to testify in criminal cases by granting them immunity from prosecution and providing protection and benefits that ensure their safety and livelihood. At the heart of this reform is the central role of the Department of Justice (DOJ), whose authority was tested in the high-profile case of Webb v. De Leon (G.R. Nos. 121234, 121245, 121297, August 23, 1995).
Under Section 12 of R.A. 6981, the DOJ has the power to admit witnesses into the program. Once admitted, the certification issued by the DOJ must be given full faith and credit by public prosecutors. This means that prosecutors are barred from including the admitted witness in any criminal complaint or information, and if the witness has already been charged, the prosecutor is duty-bound to move for his or her discharge. Admission also grants the witness immunity from prosecution for the related offenses, together with access to rights and benefits such as security, relocation, subsistence, and employment assistance.
This provision was challenged by petitioner Hubert Webb, who argued that only the courts, under Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, have the authority to discharge an accused as a state witness. He claimed that allowing the DOJ to decide on the admission of witnesses intrudes upon judicial prerogatives and violates the separation of powers.
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the prosecution of crimes is fundamentally an executive function, anchored on the constitutional duty of the executive branch to “faithfully execute the laws.” The discretion to determine whether, what, and whom to charge—including who may be used as a state witness—properly belongs to the DOJ as part of its prosecutorial power. The Court clarified that while Rule 119 empowers courts to discharge an accused once jurisdiction has been acquired, this authority is jurisdictional rather than inherent. It ensures that proceedings remain orderly, but it does not strip the DOJ of its primary role in deciding witness admissions under R.A. 6981.
The decision underscores the delicate balance between the branches of government: the executive determines who to prosecute and who to use as a state witness, while the judiciary supervises proceedings once a case is filed. By upholding the DOJ’s role, the Court strengthened the Witness Protection Program as a vital tool for combating crime. As the DOJ itself pointed out, many cases in the past had been dismissed due to witnesses refusing to testify out of fear or economic dislocation. R.A. 6981 and its interpretation in Webb directly address this challenge by protecting witnesses and ensuring their cooperation.
The Webb v. De Leon ruling affirms that the DOJ’s role in the Witness Protection Program is constitutionally sound and crucial for the administration of criminal justice. By empowering the DOJ to certify and immunize state witnesses, the law tackles one of the biggest obstacles in criminal prosecutions: the silence of those who know the truth. In a justice system often hampered by fear and intimidation, the law sends a clear message—witnesses will be protected, and their courage will not be in vain.
You may download the Supreme Court case here:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/aug1995/gr_121234_1995.html
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