Tag: biodiversity

Environmental planner and economist Gus Agosto has taken a significant step in Cebu City’s ongoing land‑use debates by filing a formal notice and reservation of objection with the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD). The notice focuses on the review of the Cebu City Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) 2023–2032 and raises an issue that has been largely absent from local public discussion: compliance with the Philippine Ecosystem and Natural Capital Accounting System (PENCAS) Act, or Republic Act No. 11995, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

At the heart of the filing is a simple but powerful question: can Cebu City still afford to plan growth as if its ecosystems, watersheds, and floodplains are external to the economy? For Agosto, the clear answer is no. RA 11995 declares that “natural capital” – including land, ecosystems, and the services they provide – is a measurable economic asset of the State and its political subdivisions. This is not a mere policy preference. Under PENCAS, natural capital accounting must be integrated into planning and decision‑making, particularly where long‑term land use, infrastructure, and public‑private partnerships are involved. In practice, this means a CLUP can no longer be just a map of zones and a bundle of sectoral plans; it must demonstrate how land‑use allocations respect ecological thresholds, risk patterns, and the economic value of environmental services.

The Cebu City CLUP 2023–2032, as currently framed, does many things right on paper. It outlines sectoral strategies for housing, commerce, industry, transport, and water supply. It references hazard maps and acknowledges flooding and slope risks. But, as Agosto points out, these elements remain largely compartmentalized. The plan stops short of weaving them into a cohesive, risk‑sensitive spatial strategy that clearly shows how development is constrained by carrying capacity, hazard exposure, and environmental limits. The result is a document that appears procedurally complete—boxes ticked, chapters present—but substantively misaligned with the integrated, law‑driven planning model now required under Executive Order No. 72, DHSUD’s own guidelines, and PENCAS.

This critique matters because Cebu City is not planning on a blank slate. It is a dense, highly constrained urban area, bounded by steep uplands and a vulnerable coastline, with a well‑documented history of flooding, traffic bottlenecks, and informal settlements on marginal land. In such a context, “sectoral” planning without genuine spatial integration is not a minor technical flaw; it can translate into very real, very costly risks for communities. If new commercial or residential intensities are allowed in upland or mid‑slope areas without full accounting of downstream flood impacts, the city effectively subsidizes risk—transferring the costs to low‑lying barangays that will experience deeper and more frequent inundation.

PENCAS adds another layer. By requiring natural capital accounting, RA 11995 insists that decisions about where to build, what to conserve, and how to structure public‑private partnerships must be informed by quantified assessments of ecosystem services and environmental limits. Watersheds, coastal zones, and floodplains do not merely host development; they regulate water flows, buffer storms, and sustain fisheries and livelihoods. When these are degraded or overbuilt, the “loss” is not just aesthetic or ecological—it is economic, measurable in damage to infrastructure, loss of productive days, and increased public spending on disaster response. Natural capital accounting is a way of making these hidden costs visible before, not after, decisions are taken.

Agosto’s filing is also a reminder of DHSUD’s central role in ensuring that local planning complies with national law. Executive Order No. 72 designates the CLUP as the primary basis for zoning, infrastructure provision, and land development decisions, and gives national agencies like DHSUD the responsibility to review local plans for conformity with national standards. With PENCAS already in effect, DHSUD is now expected not only to check format and basic legal compliance, but to ask whether plans show evidence of natural capital accounting: have ecosystems been valued, thresholds identified, and risks internalized into zoning and land‑use regulations? Approving a CLUP that treats PENCAS as optional would weaken the law at precisely the moment it is meant to change planning practice on the ground.

Crucially, the notice is not framed as an attempt to stop development or to delegitimize Cebu City’s efforts to adopt a long‑term land‑use plan. Instead, it positions itself as a rights‑based and policy‑grounded reminder to strengthen the CLUP. Agosto emphasizes that the objective is to align Cebu’s growth strategy with three converging realities: the legal obligations under RA 11995 and EO 72, the ecological constraints of a flood‑ and hazard‑prone city, and the long‑term public welfare of residents who will live with the consequences of today’s zoning maps and infrastructure decisions. In other words, the call is not “no development,” but “no development that pretends nature and risk do not count.”

For local stakeholders, planners, and advocates, this intervention offers a preview of what the PENCAS era will look like in practice. Formal plans, joint ventures, and big‑ticket infrastructure will increasingly be assessed not only on their financial terms and engineering feasibility, but also on whether they recognize natural capital as part of the economic equation. Cebu City’s CLUP review is an early and important test case. Whether DHSUD chooses to treat Agosto’s filing as a technical annoyance or as an opportunity to put PENCAS into meaningful operation will say much about the future of urban planning and environmental governance in the Philippines.

Environmental decision-making in the Philippines has long relied on the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). It serves as the ultimate regulatory gatekeeper for development. Yet in a province like Cebu, upland forests stabilize water, climate, and communities. The ECC has exposed its deepest limitation. It measures environmental compliance, not environmental value..

This distinction came into sharp public view in Cebu City’s upland development debates. This was most notable in the case of Monterazzas de Cebu. It is a large mixed-use project built within the ecologically significant ridges of Barangays Guadalupe and Buhisan. It is near the headwaters of the Central Cebu Protected Landscape (CCPL) and the Budlaan–Buhisan watershed system.

A Watershed Is More Than a Development Site

Cebu’s uplands function as critical ecological infrastructure. They supply benefits that are foundational, systemic, and often invisible until lost:

• Groundwater replenishment for Metro Cebu’s aquifers
• Flood control and runoff regulation protecting low-lying urban districts
• Carbon storage and microclimate regulation mitigating urban heat impacts
• Soil retention that prevents landslides and downstream siltation
• Habitat for endemic species and biodiversity reservoirs
• Landscape identity and cultural value for Cebuanos

These benefits fall under what environmental economics calls Total Economic Value (TEV)—a framework that includes not only direct use (e.g., water supply), but also indirect use (flood control, climate regulation), option value (future medicine, ecotourism), bequest value (inheritance for future generations), and existence value (nature’s value simply for being there).

The ECC process, however, recognizes none of these as economic assets requiring valuation. It focuses instead on mitigation plans, engineering controls, and compliance commitments, answering only the question:

“Can environmental impacts be managed within acceptable regulatory limits?”

It does not ask the larger, economically decisive question:

“What is the value of what will be lost, even if mitigation is implemented?”

The ECC is a compliance mechanism. It checks if an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) exists. It also checks if mitigation measures are proposed. Finally, it ensures that pollution thresholds fall within permissible standards. But compliance is not valuation, and mitigation is not the same as replacing lost natural capital. This structural limitation represents a market failure. It converts ecological services into unpriced subsidies for development. This shifts costs to communities, households, local governments, and future generations.

The Monterazzas Case: Legally Compliant, Economically Incomplete

Monterazzas secured an ECC because it fulfilled its regulatory obligations. These obligations included drainage systems, slope protection, detention ponds, tree replacement, and environmental monitoring plans. From a compliance standpoint, the approval was defensible.

Yet public backlash surged after severe rain events in 2019 and 2021 intensified flooding in downstream Cebu communities. Flooding cannot be attributed to a single development alone. However, the case crystallized a broader reality. The cumulative cost of upland land conversion was never evaluated in economic terms.

No valuation was conducted for:

• Reduced aquifer recharge from increased impervious surfaces
• Lost flood buffering previously performed by forested slopes
• Carbon stock reduction from land clearing
• Increased sediment load affecting rivers and drainage systems
• Public loss of ecological security and landscape heritage

These are not engineering failures. They are valuation failures—costs borne by communities and future generations, not by project balance sheets.

Mitigation Is Not Valuation

A detention pond cannot replace a mountain’s hydrological function.
Tree replanting cannot immediately restore decades of carbon storage.
Slope stabilization cannot substitute the slow work of root-bound soil ecology.

The ECC system can reduce harm, but it cannot measure the economic magnitude of what is permanently altered or foregone. As a result, developments may be:

✔ legally compliant
✖ economically suboptimal
✖ socially contested
✖ ecologically irreversible

Non-Use Values Matter to the Public—Even If the ECC Cannot See Them

What made the debate over Cebu’s uplands emotionally charged was not only flooding—it was the perception of losing something irreplaceable:

• Cebu’s last remaining green ridgelines
• Intergenerational access to functioning watersheds
• The comfort of knowing nature still exists at scale
• A shared ecological identity built into the Cebuano sense of place

These are non-use values—intangible yet real, and entirely absent in ECC assessment.

Toward a New Standard: Valuing Nature, Not Just Regulating It

If Cebu is to balance growth with survival, environmental governance must change significantly. It must evolve beyond impact mitigation. It should also move toward natural capital valuation.

Future upland development decisions should integrate:

• Total Economic Valuation (TEV)
• Hydrological and carbon loss accounting
• Cumulative impact costing
• Natural Capital Accounting (aligned with PENCAS)
• LGU-level ecosystem service valuation in land use planning
• Public trust and intergenerational equity as development thresholds

Because while the ECC may authorize a project, only economics can reveal its true costs—and only ecology pays them back.

The central lesson from Cebu is clear:

Development must not only comply with environmental rules.
It must account for environmental worth.
Otherwise, what is permitted is not always what is sustainable.

What Is Legal Is Not Always Economic

The ECC ensures projects meet environmental regulations. It does not ensure that development decisions make economic sense when nature’s services are fully priced. In rapidly urbanizing regions like Cebu, ignoring this distinction leads to developments that seem profitable in private ledgers. However, they impose hidden public costs that increase over time.

Cebu’s uplands are not free. Their services are not infinite. And their depreciation is not costless.

Nature’s contributions need to be priced, recorded, and defended like any other form of capital. Without these measures, the province will continue approving projects that are technically compliant. However, these projects will remain economically incomplete.

The ECC prevents illegal environmental harm.
Valuation prevents unaffordable environmental loss.
Cebu urgently needs both.

The Philippines is a nation blessed with incredible biodiversity. However, it is plagued by deforestation. The country is embarking on a new chapter in forest management. Environment Secretary Raphael P.M. Lotilla recently launched the Sustainable Forest Land Management Agreement (SFLMA). He hailed it as a “major shift.” It promises to revolutionize how the country’s 15.8 million hectares of forest land are managed.

On the surface, SFLMA sounds like a win-win. It streamlines seven fragmented forest tenure instruments into a single, renewable 25-year contract. It also encourages diverse uses like agroforestry, tourism, and conservation. The goal? Foster job creation, cut red tape, and promote inclusive economic growth. The DENR even rolled out complementary initiatives: “Forest for Life: 5 Million Trees by 2028” and mapping over 1.18 million hectares as “Potential Investment Areas (PIAs)” ready for private-sector cash.

Officials are calling it a “new era where conservation and commerce go hand-in-hand.” But is it truly a green revolution? Or does it hold hidden risks for the environment? What about the very communities dependent on these forests?

Legal and Economic Foundations: Operationalizing PNEACAS

The SFLMA is not merely a land-use policy; it is the operational execution of the Philippine National Ecosystem and Climate Accounting System (PENCAS) Law (Republic Act No. 11995). PENCAS legally mandates the integration of the environment’s economic value into national policy. It provides the foundational framework for the SFLMA’s valuation requirement. The agreement requires the calculation of the Total Economic Value (TEV) of the forest. It moves beyond traditional resource extraction models. This TEV approach is guided by the United Nations System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) standards mandated by PNEACAS. It ensures that forest stewardship is financially incentivized.

The TEV calculation is divided into two distinct components, which define the roles of financial experts and environmental economists. The first, Valuation of Tangible Assets (Market Value), uses financial methods to evaluate profitability. These methods include Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Real Options Analysis (ROA). They determine commercial profitability from timber, non-timber products, and fixed user fees. This component is essential for attracting investment and securing financing.

The second and more innovative component is the Valuation of Intangible Services (Non-Market Value). This component monetizes public environmental goods, directly supporting the goals of PNEACAS. By converting ecological preservation into a quantifiable revenue stream, the SFLMA attempts to align conservation with long-term financial interest.

The Critical Role of the Economist

The economist’s function is to serve as the translator between ecological sustainability and financial viability. They achieve this by monetizing non-market benefits. This process directly addresses the core mandates of the PENCAS Law. They generate the data required for policy alignment and incentive design. Specifically, the economist calculates the value of carbon sequestration by applying the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC). This application turns stored carbon into tradable financial assets, known as carbon credits. This conversion establishes a critical revenue stream for reforestation. They apply the Replacement Cost Method to value watershed services. This method involves estimating the expense of building man-made infrastructure to replace the forest’s natural function. Furthermore, they use the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) in surveys. These surveys quantify the public’s Willingness To Pay (WTP) for biodiversity. They also assess ecotourism. Through these processes, the economist ensures the SFLMA valuation is consistent with the SEEA framework. They guarantee the environmental statistics are credible and can be integrated into the national economic accounts. This demonstrates that the forest is worth more when preserved than when depleted.

Structural Incentives and Regulatory Risks

The SFLMA’s structural benefits include bureaucratic simplification. This reduces red tape. The 25-year long-term tenure provides the necessary security for substantial, sustainable investment. It mandates an integrated management plan, theoretically ensuring holistic management across production and protection uses.

However, critics cite significant policy risks. A primary concern is the potential for elite capture. This concern is driven by unequal land caps. These caps allow corporations to secure up to 40,000 hectares while capping People’s Organizations (POs) at 1,000 hectares. The technical complexity of TEV calculation adds an additional barrier. It requires sophisticated financial modeling such as DCF, ROA, and CVM. This complexity effectively excludes marginalized Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and POs that lack extensive external technical and financial support.

Furthermore, the policy faces criticism regarding its environmental oversight. The provision allows proponents to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) after the SFLMA is awarded. This reverses standard environmental procedure. It creates a potential loophole for environmentally damaging activities. The broad allowance for “special uses,” including industrial facilities, raises fears. There is concern about the industrial conversion of biodiverse areas into monoculture plantations or logistical hubs. This could potentially undermine the conservation goals inherent in the PNEACAS framework. The unresolved ambiguity surrounding the ownership of benefits from carbon credits also poses a risk. There may be disputes and unfair distribution of benefits among the state, investors, and local communities.

Safeguards and the Critical Path Forward

The DENR has attempted to mitigate these risks by articulating key safeguards. Key safeguards include the strict requirement for Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) in ancestral domains. They also involve using Performance-Based Renewal. In this system, the 25-year contract renewal depends on stringent performance against specific Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics. SFLMA holders are also mandated to include social development programs to ensure local employment and fair wages.

The success of the SFLMA hinges entirely on the rigorous enforcement of these social and environmental safeguards. For the policy to truly be a green revolution, it must overcome significant institutional challenges. It must ensure that the benefits quantified through the PNEACAS-mandated valuation framework are equitably shared. Community groups must be empowered to participate effectively. They should not be marginalized by the very system designed to value the resources they steward. Without this transparency, the SFLMA cannot succeed. Equitable implementation is essential. Despite its sophisticated economic design, it risks becoming a vehicle for resource consolidation and further environmental degradation.

Reference:

1. Sustainable Forest Land Management Agreement (SFLMA)
2. Philippine Ecosystem and Natural Capital Accounting System (PENCAS) Act