Why the CLUP Cannot Be Overridden by a Simple Ordinance

In conversations about Cebu City’s development, one dangerous misconception keeps circulating:

“The CLUP is just a tool. The City Council can always pass a new ordinance to change it.”

This idea is not only false —
it is illegal, misleading, and destructive to long-term planning.

The CLUP is not a casual instrument.
It is the foundation of the city’s entire land-use system, backed by national law, Supreme Court jurisprudence, and technical standards.

This explainer breaks down, in clear language, why the CLUP cannot be casually altered, and why it must remain the city’s controlling land-use document.

1. The CLUP Is a Legal Mandate — Not an Optional Planning Tool

The Local Government Code (RA 7160) is explicit:

“Local government units SHALL prepare their comprehensive land use plans…
which SHALL be the PRIMARY and DOMINANT bases for land use.”
(Sec. 20, RA 7160)

Let’s unpack this:

✔ “SHALL” — means mandatory, not optional

✔ “PRIMARY and DOMINANT” — means superior to all land-use ordinances

✔ “Bases for land use” — means all zoning and land decisions MUST follow it

The CLUP is NOT:

a guideline
an advisory document
a flexible policy tool

It is a statutory requirement and it shapes every land-use decision the city makes.

2. The CLUP Is Approved by National Agencies — So a Simple Ordinance Cannot Override It

Under Executive Order 72 and DHSUD/HLURB Rules, the CLUP must pass through:

Technical planning
Public consultations
CPDO review
City Council adoption
Regional Land Use Committee (RLUC) approval
NEDA oversight

This makes the CLUP part of the national planning system.

A regular ordinance:

does not undergo national review
does not pass through RLUC
does not require technical studies
is not evaluated for hazards, transport, drainage, or environmental impact

Therefore:

A local ordinance cannot overrule a document that required multi-level approval.

The CLUP is a nationally aligned, technically vetted plan.
A zoning amendment is not.

3. The Zoning Ordinance (ZO) Is Only Valid if It Conforms to the CLUP

This is often misunderstood.

The Zoning Ordinance is the implementing arm of the CLUP.
It cannot contradict the CLUP — it must FOLLOW it.

The Supreme Court has said this in black-and-white:

A. Rizal v. Mandaluyong (2005)

Zoning must conform to the CLUP; otherwise, the ordinance is invalid.

B. Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s (2008)

Any deviation from the CLUP requires a CLUP amendment FIRST.

C. Hacienda Luisita v. DAR (2011)

Land-use changes must be consistent with the approved CLUP.

These rulings make one thing clear:

A zoning ordinance that contradicts the CLUP is illegal and void.

So the common LGU practice of “rezoning by ordinance” without CLUP amendment is contrary to law.

4. The CLUP Protects Cebuanos Against Dangerous, Arbitrary, or Politically Driven Land-Use Changes

This is the purpose of having a legally binding CLUP.

Without a strong CLUP:

developers can lobby for spot zoning
upland areas can be converted illegally
floodplains can be reclassified as commercial
hazard zones can be opened for construction
transport systems lose their logic
water supply planning collapses
disaster risk increases
the environment becomes negotiable

The CLUP ensures decisions are based on:

science
terrain
hazard maps
environmental limits
water capacity
transport systems
long-term growth

—not political influence.

A casual ordinance bypasses all of these safeguards.

5. Changing the CLUP Requires a Full, Regulated Amendment Process — Not a Shortcut

Can the CLUP be amended?
YES — but only through a formal, technical process, not by a simple ordinance.

CLUP amendments require:

updated technical studies
barangay consultations
environmental and hazard assessments
CPDO evaluation
Sanggunian approval
DHSUD regional approval
RLUC/NEDA conformity

That takes months, sometimes years.

A zoning ordinance alone takes a few weeks —
which is why some LGUs prefer shortcuts.

But these shortcuts are illegal and expose the city to legal, environmental, and governance risks.

6. The CLUP Has Constitutional Weight

The 1987 Constitution guarantees:

“The right to a balanced and healthful ecology.”
(Art II Sec 16)

Land use planning is one of the main instruments used by LGUs to fulfill this constitutional mandate.

If officials bypass, ignore, or override the CLUP, they violate:

Constitutional policy
Environmental safety
National planning standards
Due process
Risk reduction principles

This is why the CLUP is not a tool —
it is a constitutional obligation.

7. What Happens If Cebu Treats the CLUP as “Just a Tool”?

The consequences are immediate and severe:

✔ legally void zoning ordinances

✔ invalid permits

✔ increased liability for LGU officials

✔ misaligned infrastructure

✔ worsening flooding

✔ unregulated upland development

✔ breakdown of transport logic

✔ worsening housing crisis

✔ environmental degradation

✔ higher disaster risk

Cebu City cannot afford these outcomes —
not with its limited land, growing population, and worsening climate hazards.

The CLUP Is the City’s Land-Use Constitution

It is:

mandated by national law
affirmed by the Supreme Court
integrated with national planning bodies
approved through RLUC
the basis of zoning
the backbone of environmental protection
the anchor of water, transport, and infrastructure planning
the legal safeguard against arbitrary land-use decisions

When officials say:

“We can override the CLUP with a new ordinance,”

they are misunderstanding —
or ignoring —
the entire Philippine land-use legal system.

Cebu deserves better.
Cebu deserves planning grounded in law, science, and long-term vision —
not shortcuts.

Why Cebu City’s Housing Plan Cannot Work: A Critical Look at the CLUP’s Most Serious Weakness

This article begins my multi-part series on Cebu City’s new Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) and Zoning Ordinance (ZO).
Over the next few weeks, we will look closely at what this plan gets right, what it gets wrong, and how its flaws shape Cebu’s future — for better or for worse.

We begin with the sector that affects all others: HOUSING.

Because where people live determines how they move, how they work, how communities grow, and ultimately whether a city becomes livable — or collapses under its own weight.

And right now, Cebu City’s housing plan is on the wrong path.

The Huge Gap Between Housing Needs and Housing Reality

The City estimates that 865,725 housing units are needed to address the backlog and future demand.
To accommodate that number, the CLUP calculates that Cebu City would need 15,169 hectares of additional residential land.

But here is the problem:

Cebu City does not have 15,169 hectares of buildable land.

It doesn’t even come close.

Cebu is not a flat province like Cavite or Laguna.
It is a mountain city with narrow slopes, rivers, steep terrain, coastal hazards, and protected watersheds.

Only about 25–30% of Cebu’s total land is actually suitable for safe residential development.

In other words:

The very formula used to compute Cebu’s housing demand does not fit Cebu’s geography.

It’s like measuring a mountain with a ruler designed for plains.

And because the method is wrong, the strategies that follow also fall apart.

So Where Will Cebu Build? The CLUP’s Answer: SRP

Because Cebu lacks large, flat, safe tracts of land, the CLUP turns almost entirely to the South Road Properties (SRP) — a reclaimed area exposed to storm surge, subsidence, and liquefaction — as the primary relocation site for the urban poor.

The City actually owns 313 hectares of land across 211 parcels.
But a massive 240 hectares (76%) of this land is in SRP.

This explains the CLUP’s insistence on building:

Temporary housing in SRP
Permanent high-rise housing in SRP
Social housing clusters in SRP

SRP is the easiest to access politically.
But it is also one of the most dangerous places to house the poor.

Relocating families from riverbanks and hazard zones only to place them in a coastal hazard zone is not progress — it is risk transfer.

It moves people out of danger… and into another kind of danger.

The “Permanent Housing” Plan Is Even Harder to Believe

The CLUP describes an ambitious “South Coastal Urban Development” (SCUD) project:

5-storey, 10-storey, and 20-storey MRBs
Long-term leases “like Singapore”
Thousands of families relocated to high-density towers

But the proposed site is still underwater.
The land does not exist yet — it must be reclaimed first.

Even if the concept is good, the location and timing are not.

It will take years before the land is ready.
And billions upon billions before the buildings rise.

Which brings us to another uncomfortable truth.

The CLUP Claims ₱26 Billion Per Year for Housing — Cebu’s Budget Is Only ₱13 Billion

The CLUP states that the City is allocating ₱26 billion annually for MRB construction.

But Cebu City’s entire 2026 budget is only ₱13 billion.

Meaning:

The housing plan requires twice the city’s entire budget
No one knows where the money will come from
No financing model, PPP structure, or national commitment is presented

It is a beautiful idea with no financial backbone.

Housing towers may be drawn on paper,
but they cannot be built with numbers that do not exist.

So Why Not Use the City’s Other Land?

Outside SRP, the City owns:

66.37 hectares

Used for schools, barangay halls, and urban poor housing.

These areas could be transformed into strategic mid-rise communities connected to jobs and transport.
But the CLUP does not propose land consolidation, urban regeneration, or vertical redevelopment.

6.79 hectares

Remain idle — mostly upland, steep, or constrained.

These lands are unsuitable for housing and should remain ecological buffers.

The Housing Plan Is Isolated — Not Integrated With Transport, Jobs, Commerce, or Water

Housing is not a standalone sector.
It must align with:

transportation systems
BRT corridors
commercial centers
industrial zones
water supply
hazard maps
drainage systems

But Cebu’s housing plan exists in a silo.

It does not place housing near jobs.

It does not place housing near BRT stations.

It does not expand residential areas near commercial centers.

It does not address water scarcity for 865,000 new units.

It does not protect uplands from overdevelopment.

It does not calculate relocation impacts on transport or flooding.

It treats housing as if it floats above the city, unaffected by everything else.

That is not how cities work.

What We Are Left With Is a Housing Plan That Cannot Succeed

❌ The method is wrong for Cebu’s geography

❌ The land available does not match the land required

❌ The largest landholding (SRP) is hazard-prone

❌ The permanent housing site is underwater

❌ The budget is twice the city’s capability

❌ The plan does not integrate with transport, jobs, or water

❌ The uplands cannot support more sprawl

❌ The poor are relocated to isolation

This is not simply an imperfect plan.
It is a plan built on structural contradictions.

Cebu needs a housing strategy grounded in:

vertical development
transit-oriented planning
safe, accessible locations
integrated public land redevelopment
financial realism
environmental science
climate resilience

The CLUP does not offer that.

Not yet.

What Comes Next in This Series

In the next articles, we’ll dive into:

Part 2 — Transport & Mobility: Where the CLUP Went Wrong

Why the BRT is disconnected from land use, and how transport planning became an afterthought.

Part 3 — Commercial & Industrial Zones: Misalignment and Missed Opportunities

A look at the political economy of zoning.

Part 4 — Environment, Flooding & Watersheds: The Consequences of Poor Planning

How upland mismanagement worsens lowland floods.

Part 5 — Governance, Variances & Loopholes: How the Zoning Board Can Override Everything

The silent powers shaping Cebu’s future.

This is the beginning of a deeper conversation —
one Cebu desperately needs.

Why Cebu’s CLUP Must Be Reviewed Now:

The Law Has Changed — Our Planning Must Change With It

Urban planning is not just about drawing maps or assigning colors to land. It is about shaping how people live, how cities grow, and how communities stay safe. In a time when flooding has reached catastrophic levels in Cebu, we can no longer pretend that our current land-use system is enough.

The truth is simple: Cebu City’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) is outdated. It no longer reflects the new legal, scientific, and ecological standards that planners are now required to follow. And unless the CLUP is reviewed and corrected, the city will continue to make decisions that worsen flooding, landslides, and environmental collapse.

1. PENCAS Changed the Entire Landscape of Land-Use Planning

The Philippine Ecosystem and Natural Capital Accounting System (PENCAS) Act introduced a revolutionary requirement:
Government must account for the value of ecosystems, watershed functions, water recharge, soil stability, and the economic value of nature itself.

PENCAS was signed into law on May 22, 2024 as Republic Act 11995. Meanwhile, the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance on June 30,2025.

Before PENCAS, CLUPs mainly focused on land use—where houses, commercial buildings, roads, or industries should go. After PENCAS, that is no longer enough.

A compliant CLUP must now quantify:

How much forest, river, or watershed capacity is being lost
How upland developments reduce water absorption
How much “natural capital” is being depleted when slopes are cut
How these losses translate into economic damage (flooding, disasters, carbon loss, siltation)

Cebu’s current CLUP does not do this. It is operating on an old framework while the law has moved forward.

2. ECCs for Upland Developments Also Fall Short

Environmental Compliance Certificates (ECCs) for subdivisions, commercial estates, and roads in the uplands were issued using pre-PENCAS standards.

Most Environmental Impact Statements focused on:

earthworks
drainage structures
erosion controls
But almost none assessed watershed function, downstream flood risk, cumulative basin impact, or natural capital loss—which PENCAS now requires.

This is why upland developments continue to be approved even if they sit on steep slopes, natural drainage paths, and fragile geological formations.

3. This Is Not Optional Knowledge — Planners Must Know This by Heart

Environmental planners, geologists, engineers, and city officials are now expected to integrate natural capital accounting into every zoning decision. That includes:

development suitability analysis
watershed carrying capacity
runoff modeling
ridge-to-reef planning
accounting for carbon sinks and biodiversity

If planners continue operating with outdated tools, they are making decisions that violate the very law they swore to uphold.

4. A Non-Compliant CLUP Is a Legal Liability

A CLUP that does not integrate PENCAS can be questioned for:

grave abuse of discretion
failure to perform ministerial duties under the Local Government Code and PENCAS
violating the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology

Cebu City cannot afford to implement a plan that is legally vulnerable and scientifically obsolete—especially when thousands of lives and billions in property are at stake.

5. The Consequences Are Measurable: More Flooding, More Damage

Flooding in Cebu is not simply caused by rain.
It is the product of upland disruption:

excessive cut-and-fill
blocked natural waterways
subdivisions and roads acting as mini-dams
forest cover loss
soil compaction
reduced infiltration

When a CLUP does not account for these, the result is predictable: water that should have been absorbed in the uplands rushes violently into lowland communities.

The disaster we saw during Typhoon Tino is not an accident.
It is the output of planning failures.

6. Reviewing the CLUP Is Not Political — It Is a Legal, Scientific, and Moral Responsibility

A CLUP cannot remain static in a time of climate crisis. It must evolve with:

new hazard data
new scientific findings
new national laws
new development pressures
new experiences of disaster

If the city refuses to review its CLUP now, it is refusing to learn, refusing to adapt, and refusing to protect its people.

Final Word: Cebu Deserves a CLUP That Protects, Not Endangers

Cebu does not lack intelligence, science, or expertise. It lacks alignment.
The CLUP must be updated.
ECC processes must be reformed.
Planners must operate using modern standards.
And citizens must demand a planning system that finally honors the value of our uplands, our watersheds, and our right to safety.

A CLUP review is not just a technical exercise.
It is a step toward a safer Cebu, a smarter Cebu, and a Cebu that finally plans with the future—not the past—in mind.

Why I Choose to Speak Out on Upland Development — And Why the Public Must Be Informed

In recent days, a former Cebu City planning official publicly commented on the concerns surrounding the Monterazzas development. This matter has become widely discussed in both local and national circles. The issue is already the subject of a Senate investigation, and the local government has likewise initiated its own review. The former official advised that concerns should not be raised through Facebook or media. Instead, they should be brought exclusively through formal government channels.

I acknowledge that formal complaints are important, and official processes must indeed be followed. In fact, formal complaints are now being prepared for submission to the appropriate national agencies. But urging silence does not resolve the issue.

But I must also be honest: flooding has reached communities that have never experienced it. Upland slopes are being altered without clarity on compliance with national laws. Environmental decisions affect thousands of people downstream. Staying silent is not an option. Speaking only within bureaucratic channels is not enough.

And what is worse, this approach shifts the focus away from the actual environmental and legal issues. It focuses on silencing public participation. This happens even as thousands of residents in the lowlands are dealing with unprecedented flooding. Urging people to stay quiet does not resolve the problem; it only deepens public confusion and delays accountability.

I speak publicly because environmental governance in the Philippines is built on public participation, public disclosure, and public vigilance. Our own laws require it. PD 1586 (the EIA System) underlines the public’s rights. RA 9729 (Climate Change Act), RA 11038 (ENIPAS Act), and RA 10587 (Environmental Planning Act) also support these rights. Additionally, even the 1987 Constitution itself emphasizes the public’s right to know what is happening in their environment. It also stresses their duty to stay informed.

Environmental harm does not happen in isolation. It does not wait for paperwork. And it does not confine its effects to the offices where documents are filed. It spills into homes, businesses, rivers, roads, and ecosystems.

The recent flooding in Cebu City’s lowland barangays is a painful reminder of this reality. People who never experienced flooding in their lifetime suddenly found water inside their homes. They deserve clear answers—not after months of internal review, but now. They deserve transparency on upland developments. They need clear information on slope stability and ECC issuances. It is necessary to confirm if laws like PD 705 and PD 1998 were followed. This is especially crucial in areas where slopes exceed the 18% restriction.

Public discussion does not undermine government processes. It strengthens them. It forms a record and mobilizes awareness. It gives voice to communities. They may not know how to navigate official channels. However, they certainly feel the consequences of development decisions made in the highlands.

Yes, I will file formal complaints. That is being done. But informing the public, raising awareness, sharing technical findings, and inviting civic discussion are equally necessary. They are not acts of defiance—they are acts of democratic participation. These actions are fully protected by our Constitution’s guarantee of access to matters of public concern. It also ensures the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

To the many who asked why I speak up: I speak because the public deserves the truth. I speak because environmental planning is not merely about documents—it is about people, communities, watersheds, and future generations. I speak because what happens in the uplands affects what happens in the lowlands. And I speak because silence, when there is a clear environmental risk, would do more harm. It would be a greater disservice than discomforting a few.

Transparency protects communities. Silence protects no one.

Why Cebu Must Value Both Use and Non-Use Benefits of Its Uplands

Public discussions on Cebu’s upland resources often rely on a narrow and misleading definition of “economic value.” For years, local discourse has focused on equating economic worth with the revenues earned from quarrying and extraction. This creates the persistent and dangerous misnomer that natural wealth is measured solely by use value.

This belief is repeated in public forums, policy pronouncements, and fiscal reports. It suggests that whatever Cebu can extract, haul, crush, or sell represents the true economic contribution of its uplands. In reality, economics does not define wealth this way. Modern environmental economics evaluates natural systems differently. True economic valuation includes use values. It also includes non-use values. Ignoring non-use values results in incomplete analysis. This leads to flawed public policy. It causes environmental decline. It exacerbates climate vulnerability.

Before addressing this conceptual flaw, the scale of Cebu’s mineral economy must be clearly understood. The province is not operating a ₱600-million quarrying industry, as public officials often portray. It is operating a ₱20-billion extraction economy per year. When metallic and non-metallic activities are combined, the actual size of Cebu’s mineral economy becomes undeniable: ₱20.18 billion in 2024, ₱21.53 billion in 2023, and ₱19.32 billion in 2022. This is the real magnitude of extraction occurring in the uplands—far larger than what provincial income statements suggest.

Cebu’s quarry operators, processors, haulers, and construction supply chains transact between ₱7.5–₱12.5 billion annually in non-metallic sales alone, while metallic operations consistently exceed ₱18 billion per year. By contrast, government revenue—₱628 million in 2023—represents only 2–4% of Cebu’s total mineral economy. Thus, a massive private extraction economy generates billions in sales and profit. Meanwhile, public income is thin. It is too small to offset the environmental and social costs borne by the public.

This fixation on quarry revenue—and even the broader ₱20-billion extraction economy—reveals the deeper misconception underpinning current policies. It is the assumption that the value of natural resources lies primarily in what can be extracted from them.

This is not how economics works. Modern environmental economics, natural resource theory, and the Total Economic Value (TEV) framework all provide important lessons. They teach that real economic worth consists of use values and non-use values. Use values include quarrying, water extraction, timber, and agriculture. Recreation and tourism are also included. These activities are easily monetized and prominently appear in financial statements. Yet these represent only a fraction of total wealth.

Non-use values, although invisible in budgets and COA reports, are economically real. They represent the benefit of simply knowing that forests and watersheds exist (existence value). They also include the value of leaving ecosystems intact for future generations (bequest value). Non-use values cover the value of keeping nature available for future or unknown uses (option value). They encompass the value derived from knowing that other communities benefit from intact uplands (altruistic value). These are precisely the values Cebu loses. This happens the moment a mountain is cut, a slope is excavated, or a watershed is bulldozed.

The consequences of ignoring non-use values are visible today in the worsening flooding across Metro Cebu. Cebu’s intense focus on use values and extraction leads to destruction. This destruction affects the non-use values that sustain long-term stability. When uplands are stripped, infiltration declines; runoff accelerates; sedimentation increases; river capacity shrinks; and flood peaks intensify. This is why Metro Cebu now floods even without typhoons and why ordinary rainfall brings cities to a halt. Every ton of aggregates removed from Cebu’s uplands reduces the natural economy. This reduction affects flood mitigation, slope stability, groundwater recharge, biodiversity, and climate regulation.

In short, this is the heart of Cebu’s political economy of flooding:

A ₱20-billion extraction economy drives upland degradation.
A ₱600-million public revenue creates the illusion of fiscal benefit.
A multi-billion-peso ecological loss is imposed on the public.
A non-functioning natural protection system results in chronic flooding.

Short-term extraction is displacing long-term security.

These losses constitute ecological depreciation—the downward adjustment of natural capital from human activity. Government does not record this depreciation. However, households and businesses pay for it. They endure flooded homes. Business districts are paralyzed, and infrastructure is damaged. Transportation is disrupted. There are lost workdays, medical incidents, and increased LGU emergency spending. Against these losses, quarry revenues are negligible.

The core economic argument is simple: Cebu is counting the small gains and ignoring the massive losses. The province records quarry taxes, permit fees, operator sales, and extraction-based employment. However, it does not account for the loss of watershed integrity, slope stability, and infiltration capacity. It also overlooks groundwater reserves, biodiversity, and climate resilience. Social cohesion, cultural heritage, and intergenerational equity are ignored too. This is not just incomplete economics—it is incorrect economics. One cannot claim economic benefit from quarrying while ignoring the far greater economic harm caused by upland degradation. A ₱20-billion extraction economy is running alongside a collapsing natural economy. The outcome is predictable. The province gains short-term financial flows but accumulates long-term environmental debt.

This dynamic lies at the heart of Cebu’s political economy of flooding. A ₱20-billion extraction economy continues to drive upland degradation. A ₱600-million public revenue stream creates the illusion of fiscal benefit. A multi-billion-peso ecological loss is imposed on the public. And a weakened, fragmented natural protection system results in chronic flooding across urban and peri-urban areas. Short-term extraction has displaced long-term security, and the costs are borne disproportionately by downstream communities—not the operators who profit upstream.

Moving forward, Cebu can no longer afford a development model that counts quarry revenue but ignores watershed collapse. The province must make rational, future-oriented decisions. To do so, it must abandon the misnomer that use value alone defines economic wealth. The real economy of Cebu’s uplands includes their role as natural flood buffers. These uplands function as water towers and contribute to climate regulation. They have cultural and identity significance. Their value is also crucial to future generations. Cebu cannot call itself progressive if it treats natural capital as expendable. It cannot claim resilience if it undermines the uplands that protect the lowlands.

Economics is not about extraction. It is the total value—use and non-use, present and future, private gain and public cost. Until Cebu adopts this full accounting, it will continue to profit in pesos. However, it will lose wealth in floods, landslides, and ecological decline.

Why I Wrote to the Senate: Strengthening ECC Governance and Enforcing RA 10587

The recent events surrounding the Monterrazas de Cebu development—and the Senate investigation that followed—have brought national attention. These events have highlighted long-standing weaknesses in our environmental regulatory system. The incident goes beyond the tragic flooding and slope failures. It exposes deeper structural issues in the way Environmental Compliance Certificates (ECCs) are evaluated and approved. This is especially concerning in areas that the law classifies as Environmentally Critical Areas (ECAs).

I work as an Environmental Planner, Real Estate Consultant, and researcher. My fields intersect law, economics, and natural capital. I felt compelled to articulate these systemic concerns. I did this through a formal letter addressed to Senator Risa Hontiveros and the members of the Senate.

My letter emphasizes three core points:

First, Proclamation No. 2146 and Presidential Decree No. 1586 clearly designate steep slopes, geohazard zones, and watershed recharge areas as Environmentally Critical Areas. These areas require the highest level of scientific scrutiny. This must happen before any development is allowed. Despite this, ECCs continue to be issued in areas of high ecological and hazard sensitivity.

Second, the Environmental Planning Act of 2013 (RA 10587) contains mandates. It requires that licensed Environmental Planners prepare and sign environmental planning work. This work includes EIAs, hazard studies, hydrologic analyses, and land-use planning. In the case of Monterrazas, this requirement was not met. Non-enforcement of this law compromises the scientific integrity of ECC submissions.

Third, the Monterrazas incident is not an isolated oversight but a symptom of a broader institutional problem. ECCs are too often granted despite incomplete or inadequate assessments. Clear statutory obligations are in place to safeguard communities and ecological systems, yet they are ignored.

My letter respectfully calls on the Senate to strengthen environmental governance. This can be done by ensuring that legal requirements, particularly RA 10587, are fully enforced. ECCs issued in Environmentally Critical Areas should be thoroughly reviewed. Additionally, DENR’s evaluation systems need strengthening and increased transparency.

This moment provides a crucial opportunity to elevate environmental planning. It also helps restore public confidence in regulatory mechanisms. Additionally, it offers better protection for vulnerable landscapes and communities. I hope this contribution is useful to the Senate’s ongoing inquiry. It is also meant to aid our collective effort to build a more climate-resilient and accountable governance system.

The Political Economy of Flooding in Cebu

Every flood follows the laws of physics—but the damage it brings follows the laws of politics and economics. To understand Cebu’s recurring floods, we must examine not just rivers and drains, but land markets, incentives, and power structures.

A civic group recently released a petition calling for accountability. They demand institutional reforms and immediate interventions after the November 4, 2025 flooding. There is a deeper structural truth behind these recurrent failures—one that cannot be resolved through flood-control works alone. Flooding in Cebu is not simply a hydraulic engineering problem. It is a political economy problem. It is shaped by land markets and governance incentives. It also involves institutional weaknesses and the complex interactions between urban development and ecological systems.

The physical manifestations of Cebu’s flooding are evident. They include overflowing rivers, silted channels, blocked waterways, undersized drainage lines, and deteriorated uplands. These issues are symptoms of underlying drivers embedded in the way land is valued, used, occupied, and regulated. These systemic forces determine where people settle and where capital flows. They dictate how infrastructure is prioritized. They also influence which environmental limits are observed or ignored. Understanding the city’s flood crisis requires a new perspective. We must shift from short-term engineering responses. We should focus on a long-term examination of Cebu’s land governance and socio-economic structures.

The Limits of Engineering-Centered Solutions

For decades, Cebu’s response to flooding has relied on traditional engineering. This includes the expansion of drainage networks. It also involves the construction of embankments and the deepening of rivers. Additionally, there is the installation of floodwalls and diversion channels. These are necessary interventions and form part of any modern urban infrastructure system.

However, the severe flooding of November 4 demonstrated an important fact. Structural measures cannot compensate for degraded watersheds. They cannot make up for constricted waterways either. Additionally, land-use choices that contradict hydrological realities are not offset by these measures.

The core limitations are clear:

Upstream forests have thinned, reducing water absorption.
Urban surfaces have become more impermeable, rapidly increasing runoff.
Natural retention areas have been converted into residential and commercial zones.
Rivers have narrowed due to settlements, obstructions, and encroachments.
Drainage systems designed for past rainfall patterns are now overwhelmed by climate-intensified storms.

Engineering solutions, however well-designed, cannot fully absorb the consequences of decades of unsustainable land use and misaligned development patterns.

Land Market Pressures and Development in High-Risk Areas

Cebu’s flooding problem cannot be separated from the economics of land. As urban land becomes increasingly scarce and valuable, development pressures intensify toward hazard-prone areas:

river easements and riparian buffers,
wetlands and marshes,
floodplains and low-lying coastal areas,
steep upland slopes and watershed zones.

These areas historically served as natural drainage or water retention systems. Yet economic incentives—combined with regulatory concessions—have enabled their transformation into buildable parcels.

This trend reflects a market-driven logic: when prime land is limited, the pressure to develop environmentally sensitive areas becomes stronger. The result is a spatial configuration that maximizes short-term economic gains but increases long-term exposure to floods.

Thus, flooding is not merely caused by extreme rainfall. It is shaped by land scarcity and speculative development. Permissive regulatory environments also play a role in its formation. It is shaped by the interaction between land scarcity, speculative development, and permissive regulatory environments.

Political Incentives Favor Visible Infrastructure Over Preventive Governance

Flood-control infrastructures are politically compelling projects. They offer:

highly visible outputs,
significant budgets,
recurring maintenance contracts,
and narratives of action and responsiveness.

Because they are technically complex, such projects often escape broader public scrutiny. At the same time, some measures reduce long-term flood risk most effectively. These include watershed rehabilitation, strict easement enforcement, and climate-informed zoning. However, they are politically challenging. They require displacements, long-term planning consistency, and actions that may produce limited immediate political returns.

This imbalance in incentives explains why Cebu sees many flood-control structures. These structures do not always address the underlying drivers of vulnerability. Sometimes, they even worsen the situation.

Flooding persists not simply because engineering solutions are inadequate. It also occurs because political incentives prioritize short-term, highly visible outputs. These outputs are prioritized over structural preventive governance.

The issue is not a lack of technical knowledge among agencies. The problem continues because actions conflict with the interests of those who hold political and economic power.

This is the essence of the political economy argument.

River Degradation and Extractive Activities

Siltation, riverbed changes, and sediment buildup are major contributors to flood severity. These issues are exacerbated by:

sand and gravel extraction,
upland clearing for agriculture or development,
informal excavation,
and poor adherence to environmental safeguards.

These activities are sustained because they are economically profitable and often backed by political or economic influence. Despite their known impacts, they persist due to entrenched interests along the value chain—from local employment to construction demand.

Thus, river degradation is not merely a technical or enforcement issue. It is a governance challenge linked to resource extraction, revenue dependence, and regulatory gaps.

Enforcement Challenges Reflect Institutional Capture and Regulatory Asymmetry

Calls for strict enforcement frequently assume that institutions lack capacity or technical competence. In reality, enforcement failures are often tied to:

local political alliances,
informal settlements that represent vote-rich constituencies,
economic actors with significant influence over land use decisions,
fragmented authority across agencies,
inconsistent application of zoning and environmental rules.

Hazard-prone areas become zones of negotiation rather than regulation. This institutional dynamic contributes to weak compliance, reinforcing land-use patterns that increase flood exposure.

Flooding, therefore, arises not only from natural or physical factors but also from institutional capture and uneven regulatory power.

From Flood Control to Flood Governance

The arguments focusing on removing obstructions, correcting flawed structures, or improving inter-agency coordination are important. Yet they must be integrated into a broader, structural framework of flood governance, one that recognizes the interconnectedness of:

land markets,
watershed systems,
ecological integrity,
urban density,
climate projections,
institutional frameworks,
and political incentives.

A governance-centered approach requires:

climate-sensitive and risk-informed land use planning,
protection and restoration of watershed and riparian systems,
strict implementation of easements and hazard-zone regulations,
upstream retention strategies and nature-based solutions,
green infrastructure that enhances urban permeability,
basin-wide management across LGU boundaries,
resilient zoning and development controls,
and institutional reforms that shield planning from political and economic capture.

Cebu’s long-term resilience depends on integrating these elements into a coherent governance structure.

Conclusion

The November 4, 2025 flood event underscored the limitations of relying primarily on engineering-centric flood control. While structural interventions remain essential, they are insufficient against systemic land-use pressures. Institutional weaknesses and economic incentives drive risky development.

Flooding in Cebu is a political economy issue—rooted in how land is valued, governed, and contested. Meaningful solutions require a transition from reactive flood-control efforts. These solutions must embrace a comprehensive approach rooted in land governance, ecological integrity, institutional accountability, and long-term urban planning.

Cebu can only move toward true resilience through this shift. It will reduce its vulnerability to the increasingly severe impacts of climate and development pressures.

Beyond Compliance: Why the ECC Fails to Capture the True Value of Cebu’s Uplands

Environmental decision-making in the Philippines has long relied on the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). It serves as the ultimate regulatory gatekeeper for development. Yet in a province like Cebu, upland forests stabilize water, climate, and communities. The ECC has exposed its deepest limitation. It measures environmental compliance, not environmental value..

This distinction came into sharp public view in Cebu City’s upland development debates. This was most notable in the case of Monterazzas de Cebu. It is a large mixed-use project built within the ecologically significant ridges of Barangays Guadalupe and Buhisan. It is near the headwaters of the Central Cebu Protected Landscape (CCPL) and the Budlaan–Buhisan watershed system.

A Watershed Is More Than a Development Site

Cebu’s uplands function as critical ecological infrastructure. They supply benefits that are foundational, systemic, and often invisible until lost:

Groundwater replenishment for Metro Cebu’s aquifers
Flood control and runoff regulation protecting low-lying urban districts
Carbon storage and microclimate regulation mitigating urban heat impacts
Soil retention that prevents landslides and downstream siltation
Habitat for endemic species and biodiversity reservoirs
Landscape identity and cultural value for Cebuanos

These benefits fall under what environmental economics calls Total Economic Value (TEV)—a framework that includes not only direct use (e.g., water supply), but also indirect use (flood control, climate regulation), option value (future medicine, ecotourism), bequest value (inheritance for future generations), and existence value (nature’s value simply for being there).

The ECC process, however, recognizes none of these as economic assets requiring valuation. It focuses instead on mitigation plans, engineering controls, and compliance commitments, answering only the question:

“Can environmental impacts be managed within acceptable regulatory limits?”

It does not ask the larger, economically decisive question:

“What is the value of what will be lost, even if mitigation is implemented?”

The ECC is a compliance mechanism. It checks if an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) exists. It also checks if mitigation measures are proposed. Finally, it ensures that pollution thresholds fall within permissible standards. But compliance is not valuation, and mitigation is not the same as replacing lost natural capital. This structural limitation represents a market failure. It converts ecological services into unpriced subsidies for development. This shifts costs to communities, households, local governments, and future generations.

The Monterazzas Case: Legally Compliant, Economically Incomplete

Monterazzas secured an ECC because it fulfilled its regulatory obligations. These obligations included drainage systems, slope protection, detention ponds, tree replacement, and environmental monitoring plans. From a compliance standpoint, the approval was defensible.

Yet public backlash surged after severe rain events in 2019 and 2021 intensified flooding in downstream Cebu communities. Flooding cannot be attributed to a single development alone. However, the case crystallized a broader reality. The cumulative cost of upland land conversion was never evaluated in economic terms.

No valuation was conducted for:

Reduced aquifer recharge from increased impervious surfaces
Lost flood buffering previously performed by forested slopes
Carbon stock reduction from land clearing
Increased sediment load affecting rivers and drainage systems
Public loss of ecological security and landscape heritage

These are not engineering failures. They are valuation failures—costs borne by communities and future generations, not by project balance sheets.

Mitigation Is Not Valuation

A detention pond cannot replace a mountain’s hydrological function.
Tree replanting cannot immediately restore decades of carbon storage.
Slope stabilization cannot substitute the slow work of root-bound soil ecology.

The ECC system can reduce harm, but it cannot measure the economic magnitude of what is permanently altered or foregone. As a result, developments may be:

✔ legally compliant
✖ economically suboptimal
✖ socially contested
✖ ecologically irreversible

Non-Use Values Matter to the Public—Even If the ECC Cannot See Them

What made the debate over Cebu’s uplands emotionally charged was not only flooding—it was the perception of losing something irreplaceable:

Cebu’s last remaining green ridgelines
Intergenerational access to functioning watersheds
The comfort of knowing nature still exists at scale
A shared ecological identity built into the Cebuano sense of place

These are non-use values—intangible yet real, and entirely absent in ECC assessment.

Toward a New Standard: Valuing Nature, Not Just Regulating It

If Cebu is to balance growth with survival, environmental governance must change significantly. It must evolve beyond impact mitigation. It should also move toward natural capital valuation.

Future upland development decisions should integrate:

Total Economic Valuation (TEV)
Hydrological and carbon loss accounting
Cumulative impact costing
Natural Capital Accounting (aligned with PENCAS)
LGU-level ecosystem service valuation in land use planning
Public trust and intergenerational equity as development thresholds

Because while the ECC may authorize a project, only economics can reveal its true costs—and only ecology pays them back.

The central lesson from Cebu is clear:

Development must not only comply with environmental rules.
It must account for environmental worth.
Otherwise, what is permitted is not always what is sustainable.

What Is Legal Is Not Always Economic

The ECC ensures projects meet environmental regulations. It does not ensure that development decisions make economic sense when nature’s services are fully priced. In rapidly urbanizing regions like Cebu, ignoring this distinction leads to developments that seem profitable in private ledgers. However, they impose hidden public costs that increase over time.

Cebu’s uplands are not free. Their services are not infinite. And their depreciation is not costless.

Nature’s contributions need to be priced, recorded, and defended like any other form of capital. Without these measures, the province will continue approving projects that are technically compliant. However, these projects will remain economically incomplete.

The ECC prevents illegal environmental harm.
Valuation prevents unaffordable environmental loss.
Cebu urgently needs both.

Flood-Control Projects Alone Will Not Save Cebu—Land Use Will

The declaration by experts confirms that infrastructure alone cannot solve Cebu’s flooding crisis. Planners, scientists, and community advocates have long warned this truth. Drainage projects may manage water. However, land use decisions determine where the water goes.

No flood control masterplan, regardless of engineering quality, will succeed while:

Upland forests and recharge zones shrink faster than detention basins are built
Commercial land zones double, increasing impervious surface cover
Core city residential areas are compressed, pushing communities into hazard-prone uplands
Agricultural and green buffer landscapes decline at scale
Critical slope, soil, and watershed protections remain advisory—not mandatory

The problem is not simply inadequate pipes and culverts.
The problem is unregulated sprawl, declining absorption capacity, and the absence of enforceable ecological limits in land development.

The science is clear: Flooding is a land use failure before it is an engineering failure.

A city loses flood resilience when rainfall has nowhere to go. This happens when forests are fragmented. It also occurs when slopes are sealed and floodplains are built over. Additionally, housing is pushed uphill without geotechnical, drainage, or watershed safeguards.

The recently approved Cebu City CLUP and Zoning Ordinance thus arrives at a critical inflection point.
Commercial zones have expanded. Forests have been reduced. Affordable housing provision is minimal. The plan must now integrate mandatory disaster-responsive corrections in its implementation phase. This must happen before more irreversible exposure is built into the urban footprint.

We call on city decision-makers to embed the following as binding implementation requirements:

Slope-based and hazard-based development controls for uplands
Mandatory stormwater detention, permeable surface thresholds, and infiltration standards per project
Watershed and ridge-to-reef protection zones with enforceable buffers
Moratorium on approvals in high-risk upland settlements pending risk audit
Mid-rise affordable housing incentives within safe urban zones to prevent uphill displacement
Integration of Metro Cebu-wide watershed governance beyond city political boundaries
Creation of an independent CLUP implementation oversight body

Development is not the crisis. Ungoverned development is.

No amount of pumping stations, river walks, canal clearing, or floodgates can compensate for lost forests. They cannot compensate for paved watersheds. They cannot address displaced communities and weakened soil absorption systems. Lost forests, paved watersheds, displaced communities, and weakened soil absorption systems.

Cebu must move beyond treating floods as an aftermath problem.
Flood risk must be prevented at the point of land conversion, zoning approval, and building permit. It should not be addressed only by draining after the storm.

“What protects a city is not just how it builds its drainage…

but how it plans its land.”

We urge the City Government to ensure that CLUP implementation corrects the risk drivers of future disasters. National oversight agencies should also ensure corrective measures are taken. It should not institutionalize these risk drivers.

The aspiration should change. It should not be:
“Cebu that survives floods.” It should be:
“Cebu that no longer floods because it was planned correctly.”

Spaces of Growth, Zones of Risk: Cebu’s Land Use Paradox

The impacts of Typhoon Tino offered a stark reminder. Floods are not solely natural hazards. Instead, they are hydrological imprints of spatial decisions. Land allocation, slope conversion, river encroachment, and watershed disruption manifest their consequences most visibly during extreme weather events.

The approval of Cebu City’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) 2023–2032 redirects the public agenda. It moves from legislative formality to the more consequential arena of implementation. The legitimacy of a land use plan is not proven by its passage. Instead, it is validated by the development outcomes it produces. This is especially true when these outcomes are tested by climate, geography, and population pressure.

The new CLUP reveals major spatial shifts that carry long-term implications. Commercial land allocation more than doubled, while agricultural lands declined dramatically, and forest areas registered significant reduction. Meanwhile, socialized housing allocation remains strikingly minimal. The pattern points to a clear directional tilt. Commercial land expansion is accelerating faster than ecological buffering. It is also outpacing safe residential capacity.

As land values intensify within the urban core, households priced out of the city do not vanish. They relocate to the margins where land is cheaper and regulations are thinner. In Cebu, this relocation increasingly occurs toward upland barangays, steeper slopes, informal drainage basins, and unengineered terrain. The result is not accidental sprawl but policy-induced spatial displacement, where affordability gradients align dangerously with hazard gradients.

A persistent public misconception aggravates this risk calculus. Many people think that uplands newly classified under NIPAS (National Integrated Protected Areas System) are automatically protected. They believe these areas are free from settlement and land conversion. The law says otherwise. Under DENR Administrative Order 2008-26, Section 10(e), carried into the IRR of RA 11038, NIPAS areas may contain Multiple-Use Zones. In these zones, settlement, agriculture, agroforestry, extraction, and livelihood activities may be permitted. Even land tenure rights can be allowed, subject to the Protected Area Management Plan. In other words, NIPAS is a regulatory designation, not an automatic forest preservation guarantee. Hydrology responds to slope, soil porosity, and tree cover — not legal cartography.

Commerce expands more quickly than contour lines can withstand. Three outcomes converge. Land values rise without a parallel safe housing supply. Ecological buffers shrink faster than drainage systems are upgraded. Disaster risk is redistributed rather than reduced. The city becomes economically attractive yet environmentally fragile — bankable in dry months, breakable in wet ones.

The core policy question is therefore not “Should Cebu grow?” but rather, “Should Cebu grow without slope limits, drainage safeguards, housing balance, and hydrological discipline?” A land use plan that expands markets can be beneficial. However, if it creates flood risks for vulnerable communities, it does not represent a development strategy. It is a liability transfer encoded in zoning policy.

Urban planning must retire the outdated metric of success defined by hectares converted. It should adopt a new standard measured in households protected, watersheds stabilized, and risks prevented. Cities do not fail when the economy slows. They fail when slopes collapse and rivers overflow. Institutions run out of answers during the rainfall test they were meant to anticipate.

Cebu City now stands at a pivotal governance moment. The challenge ahead is not to stop development, but to civilize its direction. We need to build where water can be managed. Settling families in areas where slopes are stable is crucial. We must treat forests as infrastructure. Defending watersheds as life-support systems, not land reserves awaiting extraction, is vital.

The legacy of the CLUP will ultimately be judged by evacuation numbers. It will also be judged by flood marks and the geography of survival when the next typhoon arrives. Investment portfolios or skylines will not determine this legacy.

Progress is not proven by buildings standing in fair weather,
but by communities still standing after the storm.